Commentary, The Selling of Jury Deliberations by Nagel, Robert F.
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
1989 
Commentary, The Selling of Jury Deliberations 
Robert F. Nagel 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the First Amendment 
Commons 
Citation Information 
Robert F. Nagel, Commentary, The Selling of Jury Deliberations, Crim. Just. Ethics, Winter/Spring 1989, at 
31, available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/930/. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation:




William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Sep 19 17:40:54 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
                                     Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
                                     your smartphone or tablet device 
The Selling of Jury Deliberations / 31
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL, 1975-1978, at 124
(1979).
8 National News Council, I N THE PUBLIC INTEREST III, at 242
(1984).
9 Id.
10 H. GOODWIN, GROPING FOR ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 191-93 (2d
ed. 1987).
11 Telephone response from Max Frankel, executive editor
of the N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 1988).
12 J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. 1 (1859).
13 Telephone interview with F. Gilman Spencer, editor of
THE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 18, 1988).
14 E. LAMBETH, COMMITTED JOURNALISM: AN ETHIC FOR THE
PROFESSION (1986).
15 Telephone interview with Al Ellenbery, metropolitan
editor of the N. Y. POST (Oct. 18, 1988).
16 Supra note 14, at 128.
ROBERT E NAGEL
Suppose that a state enacted a statute prohibiting jurors
in criminal cases from publishing accounts of their delib-
erations. Many versions of such a statute are possible.
The restrictions might apply only within a specific time
period (say, until a year after the verdict) and they might
apply only to commercial sales. Probably the statute
would have an exception permitting written or verbal
accounts made in connection with an appeal or new
trial. Let us assume a fairly extreme law -- a permanent
prohibition against any publication except those made
as a part of the judicial process. What is the conventional
legal approach to assessing the kinds of free speech
issues raised by such a statute? How satisfactory is this
approach?
Modern constitutional analysis usually begins with an
apparently inclusive identification of the relevant inter-
ests. In this instance, of course, the most important of
these is the First Amendment right to publish. In a legal
world where school students, imprisoned felons, and
corporations all have the right to free speech, the status
of being a juror surely cannot preclude the assertion of
this right. More important than the status of the speaker
is the interest of the public in hearing what the juror has
to say. And, again, in the world of modern legal dis-
course, the potential significance of information about
jury deliberations in criminal cases cannot be denied.
Remember, the Supreme Court has already held that the
public has a constitutional interest in reading price
advertisements and seeing exotic dancing. Given these
Robert F. Nagel is Moses Lasky Professor of Law at the
University of Colorado, Boulder.
parameters, it is not surprising that the Court has em-
phatically recognized the public's need to know about
trials. This knowledge is said to be necessary for forming
opinions about the justice system and for assuring a fair
trial process. So crucial is public access to trials that the
privacy of minors who have been the victims of sex
crimes may not be protected by a rule shutting out the
press and the public during their testimony. Moreover,
the privacy interests of potential jurors will not auto-
matically justify closing off voir dire even when the jurors
are being asked about deeply personal matters. Thus,
the public's interest in information about trials extends
not only to sensitive aspects of the trial itself but also to
the jury.
With these starting points, it would certainly be diffi-
cult for any court to conclude that the public has no First
Amendment interest in access to information about
what happens inside the jury room. Both the conduct of
the trial and the composition of the jury are to some
extent mere forms that take on operational significance
during the jury's deliberations. What if jurors routinely
disregard the judges' instructions? What if racial dis-
crimination affects discussions? The juror's right to publish,
in short, carries with it the considerable weight of the
general public's interest in information relevant to fair
trials and a wise, effective justice system.
There are, however, other interests that must be iden-
tified and "balanced" against the interest in publication.
Under conventional legal analysis, a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest can justify restraints on even
core political speech. Such an interest might be impli-
cated by the statute under consideration here because
the disclosure of details of jury discussions could reduce
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the candor and depth of those discussions. At least, the
Court has already acknowledged this sort of possibility
in the famous case involving President Nixon's confiden-
tial conversations. Since many judges, including Su-
preme Court Justices, hold secret conferences while
deciding cases, the relationship between confidentiality
The legal primacy of the constitutional
interest in free speech encourages
a soft-headed suspension of
disbelief on empirical
and historical issues.
and candor would seem plausible in the context of judi-
cial proceedings as well. Moreover, the quality of delib-
eration might lead to income or notoriety. For example,
there might be an incentive to elicit conflict or drama in
the jury room and, since a hung jury might be thought to
be of less potential interest, there might also be an inap-
propriate incentive to reach unanimity. Courts would
have to carefully itemize these competing interests.
This sort of inclusive consideration of relevant interests
lends a reasonable cast to the Court's current approach to
First Amendment analysis. This impression is strength-
ened by the second stage of analysis: an effort to balance
and accommodate the various interests. The main con-
sideration at this stage is whether the governmental
interest (in the quality of jury deliberations) could be
achieved in any way that trenched less severely on the
interests involved in publication. Since our hypothetical
statute would bar almost all publication and would do so
for unlimited lengths of time, it would be vulnerable. For
instance, it might be thought that long-delayed publica-
tions, which would probably not have been contem-
plated during the deliberations, need not be prohibited in
order to achieve the state's purpose. This seems a sen-
sible objection, and it leaves open the possibility that a
more finely tailored statute might still be constitutional.
This method -- the full articulation of the relevant inter-
ests and a precise, rationalistic effort at accommodation
-- may sound reasonable enough, but I believe it limits
judicial inquiry in important ways.
Notice, first, how the legal primacy of the constitu-
tional interest in free speech encourages a soft-headed
suspension of disbelief on empirical and historical issues.
Why believe that the public has any significant need for
direct accounts of jury deliberations? Conventional con-
stitutional analysis answers this question by naming
some obviously important public issue (for example,
the justice system) and then assuming that almost any
information potentially relevant to that issue, no matter
what its character or source, is needed by the public.'
This is nearly superstitious in its simplicity. It may be
that, even without the revelations of jurors, the public
has plenty of information available to evaluate both
specific trials and the justice system generally. Possible
alternative sources include direct experience in juries
and in other small groups, scientific studies, and infor-
mation produced at trial or on appeal. Before assuming
that such sources are inadequate, it would be important
to find out the extent to which jurors' accounts have
been unavailable in the past and whether public deci-
sion making was in any way retarded as a result. In
some amorphous way, the public can be thought to
"need" to know almost anything. But without refine-
ment and substantiation, this tells us little about the
consequences of policies that restrict the availability of
information. Notice also how the emphasis on rights
and on instrumental efficacy distracts attention from
the issue of civic responsibility. It may be that our
hypothetical statute would prevent some publications
that were not specifically contemplated during jury
deliberations. However, it does not follow that the
statute is broader than necessary to accomplish the
state's purposes. Restraints, even if overbroad when
viewed from a concretely functional perspective, can be
relevant to shaping self-image and role. If jurors' under-
stand that there is a possibility of any subsequent pub-
lication, the spirit in which they approach their respon-
sibilities may be affected.
If jurors understand that there is a
possibility of any subsequent publication,
the spirit in which they approach their
responsibilities may be affected.
We often recognize that a sense of public role and
duty is inculcated by imposing special restraints on the
use of information by those with public obligations.
Lawyers can be disbarred for revealing the confidences
of their clients. Grand jurors are routinely sworn to
secrecy. Even litigants can be punished for publishing
information obtained through the process of pre-trial
discovery. To evaluate such restraints only in terms of
immediate consequences would be to ignore the impor-
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tance of a consciousness of public status and responsibil-
ity.
Much of the ritual surrounding juries has the effect of
communicating the harsh fact that jurors do not act as
individuals or as private citizens. They are sternly lec-
tured by judges who sit high and are clothed in black
robes; they are separated from their families and jobs;
they are housed in motel rooms and transported in
buses with darkened windows. Until recently, such
treatment, along with general civic education, may have
been enough to create a sense of special function so that
jurors did not often or noticeably discuss their official
experiences. It may be that this sense of purpose and
self-restraint is breaking down. A legislature might come
to the conclusion that statutory prohibitions are neces-
sary to make explicit a lesson that once had been under-
stood implicitly: that during their deliberations jurors
should see themselves, not as political observers or as
policy analysts or as social psychologists or as artists,
but as public trustees performing a specific public task.
Such a conclusion, incorporated in a statute imposing
broad duties of confidentiality on jurors, might or might
not ultimately turn out to be wise. It would entail
uncertain consequences for public debate, but it would
embody an important notion of civic duty and role.
Unfortunately, conventional free speech analysis would
only skim over both the difficulty and seriousness of the
issues posed. Experience is probably the only way to
find out how dangerous or useful such statutes would
be, and experience is what modern constitutional law
curtails.
NOTE
1 Those who think that this must be a tendentious characteri-
zation of the Court's approach are referred to Schad v. Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (need for nearby nude dancing);
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 755 (1978) (need for
opinions of corporations); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (need
for price advertisements); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254(1964) (need for defamatory information).
LOREN E. LOMASKY
Actors sell acting, bakers sell bread, chefs sell cuisine,
and so on through the alphabet. America is a land of an
endless parade of sellers transacting with buyers who, in
turn, themselves become sellers. Our legal justice sys-
tem is no exception: police, lawyers, judges, jailers
trade their services for remuneration. It is not only
capitalists who need apply; anyone is free to sell.
Some, though, would have it otherwise. In the after-
math of the Howard Beach trial, a mini-controversy has
arisen concerning the propriety of jurors receiving pay-
ment in exchange for exclusive reports of jury delibera-
tions. The practice develops in a way that generates a
more salable story. One may suspect that lurking behind
such criticism is a general conviction that dispensation
of justice and the profit motive do not mix.
How likely is it that the integrity of jury proceedings
Loren E. Lomasky, author of Persons, Rights, and the
Moral Community, is Professor of Philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota.
will be threatened from this direction? I have no way of
knowing -- nor, I suspect, does anyone else. However,
one can hazard a guess based on generally reliable
human propensities. When I do that, I find it more likely
that jury deliberations will be marginally improved by
prospects of barter than that they will be perverted. The
juror who dozes through the trial and subsequent delib-
erations will find himself not only sleeping away the op-
portunity to render a fair verdict but also possessing a
smaller stock of precise recollections to offer an acquisi-
tive press. So it is reasonable to suspect that financially-
minded jurors may be especially dutiful in paying atten-
tion to trial proceedings and to the arguments that
transpire in the jurors' room. Indeed, they may be in-
duced to take a more active and incisive role in those
deliberations: wouldn't you want to be a hero of your
own story? On balance, then, there seems at the very
least to be no overwhelming probability of trial proceed-
ings being worsened by the introduction of a cash nexus.
That, though, is speculation. I should not want to rest
the case for jurors' liberty to profit from their role on a
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